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The Evolving Financial System
and Public Policy: Conference
Highlights and Lessons
Pierre St-Amant and Carolyn Wilkins, Department of Monetary and Financial Analysis
he Bank of Canada hosted its 12th annual
economic conference in Ottawa on 4 and
5 December 2003. The subject of this confer-
ence was “The Evolving Financial System
andPublicPolicy.”Representativesfromvariouspublic
and private organizations joined Bank of Canada staff
to discuss three key issues affecting the ﬁnancial sys-
tem: ﬁnancial contagion, implications of bank diversi-
ﬁcation, and ﬁnancial sector regulation. In this article,
we report the highlights of the papers presented at the
conference and the discussions around the presenta-
tions. The views of the conference panelists, who
closed the conference with their perspective on the
papers and the discussions, are also summarized. We
conclude with key lessons for policy and directions for
future research.1
Financial Contagion
The Bank of Canada works to promote a sound and
stable ﬁnancial system, one in which problems in one
part do not trigger instability elsewhere. Financial
markets and financial infrastructure arrangements
arebecomingincreasinglyinterrelatedandglobalized.
It is therefore important to understand the channels
through which ﬁnancial crises spread across institu-
tions, sectors, and countries so that policy-makers
can understand how to safeguard systems against
contagion.
Three conference papers attempted to gain insight
into the nature of contagion. Santor (2004) studies the
extent to which Canadian banks have become glo-
1.  Conference papers and discussions are available on the Bank of Canada
Web site at: <www.bankofcanada.ca/en/economic_conference2003/
index.htm>. Proceedings of this conference will be published in 2004.
balized and how Canadian foreign-asset exposures
have adjusted to crisis events. Using ﬁrm-level panel
data from 1984 to 2003, the author ﬁnds that Canadian
banks are very active globally, and that the composi-
tion of exposures has changed over the past two dec-
ades. In particular, Canadian banks now have lower
foreign exposures in terms of deposits and loans but
higher exposures in terms of foreign securities. The
author finds that banks do not adjust their portfolios
of foreign securities immediately in the presence of
a crisis. Nor does a banking crisis in one country
appear to influence whether banks continue to do
business with countries that have similar characteristics.
Gobert, González, Lai, and Poitevin (2004) study the
lending market under centralized and decentralized
systems. The authors develop a general-equilibrium
model of a competitive interfirm lending market in
which firms can borrow or lend. They identify a
source of inefﬁciency in this market that may lead to
ﬁnancial fragility. For instance, a liquidity shock can
have a persistent component and can lead to firm
failures that are inefﬁcient. In this model, the authori-
ties can help to eliminate this inefficient equilibrium by
ensuring that there is sufﬁcient liquidity in the system.
The discussant, Douglas Gale (New York University),
was of the view that this paper represents a good step
towards the goal of building models that can be used
to analyze the welfare implications of ﬁnancial system
policies. More real-world institutional features must
be included in such models, however, before that goal
is achieved.
Gropp and Vesala (2004) take this ﬁeld of study a step
further by using market-based indicators to determine
the probability that a European bank faces ﬁnancial
difﬁculty, given that other European banks are also
T28 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2004
facing difficulty. They find significant evidence of
contagion both domestically and across borders. This
contagion appears to be typically generated by partic-
ularly concentrated interbank exposures. They also
find that larger banks are the main sources and the
main victims of cross-border contagion. The discus-
sant of this paper, Maral Kichian (Bank of Canada),
underscored various caveats to these conclusions,
including the possibility that regressors in the esti-
mated models might be endogenous. Nonetheless,
their study provides a useful starting point for future
research on this topic.
Bank Diversiﬁcation
Central banks rely on the ﬁnancial system to transmit
the effects of monetary policy actions to the real econ-
omy. For this reason, it is very important to understand
the implications of new business lines and changing
strategies for pricing and diversifying risk. Two con-
ference papers contributed to our understanding of
the links between the changing behaviour of ﬁnancial
institutions and risk-return trade-offs. These papers
suggest that diversification, encouraged to some
extent by regulatory changes, has not always had
beneﬁcial implications for the risk-return trade-off.
Stiroh (2004) studies the implications for risk-adjusted
profits of the shift in the activities of U.S. bank hold-
ing companies (BHCs) towards a wider range of ﬁnan-
cial services. This shift was encouraged by many
factors, including regulatory changes, such as the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. This Act explicitly
allowed bank holding companies and their subsidiar-
ies to engage in a host of new activities, such as bro-
kerage, portfolio advice, and underwriting. The
author ﬁnds evidence of diversiﬁcation beneﬁts in
terms of higher measures of risk-adjusted proﬁtability
for BHCs that earn most of their revenue from net
interest income. However, these gains are usually off-
set by the increased exposure to volatile non-interest
activities. These results are based on a sample of over
1,800 BHCs over the 1997Q1–2002Q2 period.
In a related paper, D’Souza and Lai (2004) study the
effects of regional and industrial diversiﬁcation in
portfolios, and of diversiﬁcation in business lines and
ﬁnancing sources, on the efficiency of Canadian
banks. They construct a measure of efficiency using a
portfolio-allocation approach. The authors ﬁnd that
bank efﬁciency is increased by diversiﬁcation of busi-
ness lines and ﬁnancing sources; reduced by regional
diversiﬁcation; and unaffected by industrial diversiﬁ-
cation. These results are based on a sample of five
major Canadian  banks over the 1997Q1–2003Q3
period. The discussant, Varouj Aivazian (University of
Toronto), found this approach an improvement over
the existing literature because it explicitly takes into
account the risk-return trade-off facing banks and,
hence, the overall welfare of banks and depositors.
The discussant also noted that, in future work, it may
be useful to look at some of the model’s assumptions
that appear to be overly simplistic. For example, the
model does not explicitly account for informational
frictions or for non-pecuniary elements in bank
returns that are not captured in price and market
return data (e.g., credit rationing and the use of
collateral).
These papers highlight the importance of studying
diversiﬁcation using measures that explicitly account
for the risk-return trade-off. Discussant Christian
Calmès (Bank of Canada) made the point that, if it is
true that diversiﬁcation does not always raise the risk-
adjusted returns to banks, future work should concen-
trate on determining the reasons why banks are not
making more proﬁtable portfolio choices. At the same
time, discussion by conference participants revealed
many deﬁciencies in the data used (e.g., short sample
periods, combining book and market value data, omit-
ting some practices such as off-balance-sheet activi-
ties), pointing to a major challenge for this type of
analysis.
Financial Sector Regulation
The Bank of Canada is very interested in how the
regulatory environment, including the regulations
themselves, supervision, or regulatory governance
(the governance arrangements of the regulatory
agencies themselves), can best promote macroﬁnan-
cial stability. The regulatory environment is deﬁned
by the rules and incentives that inﬂuence the decisions
of regulators, ﬁnancial institutions, and non-ﬁnancial
actors. Getting the incentives right is important for
sound economic performance, and these incentives
must adapt to a changing ﬁnancial landscape. Several
aspects of this issue were addressed at the conference,
including the relationship between governance and
financial sector soundness, the theoretical basis of
bank regulations for capital requirements, and the
implications of bank capital requirements for the
transmission of monetary policy.29 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2004
Das, Quintyn, and Chenard (2004) study the relation-
ship between regulatory governance and the sound-
ness of the banking sector. They construct indexes of
banking sector soundness, regulatory governance,
and public sector governance for approximately 50
countries. They then test whether these indexes are
related to the capacity of the banking sector to with-
stand shocks. Their regression results indicate that
good regulatory governance has a statistically signiﬁ-
cant, positive inﬂuence on banking sector soundness.
The results further indicate that macroeconomic con-
ditions, as well as the quality of political institutions
and public sector governance, also contribute to the
soundness of the banking system. The main lesson
from this paper for policy-makers is that good regula-
tory governance will pay off in the soundness of the
domestic ﬁnancial system. The authors suggest that
future work could extend these tests beyond the bank-
ing sector to the entire ﬁnancial system.
Although he agreed with the main conclusions of the
paper, the discussant, Claudio Borio (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements), mentioned various limitations in
the study’s empirical exercise, most of which were
related to a lack of adequate data. Developing better
multi-country data will be key for making further
progress with this type of analysis.
Dionne’s (2004) analysis of the optimal design of reg-
ulation for the banking sector is based on an extensive
review of the literature. He argues that bank regula-
tion can be justiﬁed in principle by the possibility that
bank runs could prevent banks from playing their cru-
cial role as the main provider of liquidity to the econ-
omy. The author views deposit insurance as one type
of regulation capable of mitigating that risk. That said,
Dionne thinks that national authorities should con-
tinue to improve deposit insurance by better aligning
its pricing with the risks faced by individual banks.
Authorities should also explore the possibility of
using other regulatory tools, such as subordinated
debt, and should work to improve bank governance.
With respect to minimum capital-adequacy require-
ments, Dionne argues that there is little evidence that
this approach reduces bank risk and some evidence
that it may be the source of costly distortions.
The discussant, Paul Beaudry (University of British
Columbia), argued that Dionne’s paper, and the litera-
ture in general, put too much emphasis on bank runs
as the primary source of problems in the banking
industry. He considers the main difﬁculty with the
banking system to be one of delegated monitoring
(e.g., investors delegating to banks the authority to
monitor business loans).
Gale (2004) voices concerns similar to Dionne’sre-
garding capital-adequacy requirements. The author
built a simple model of an economy with a financial
sector in which banks play a pivotal role owing to
incomplete markets. The chief conclusion to be
drawn from this model is that imposing constraints
on capital adequacy does not improve overall wel-
fare because market forces ensure that banks choose
the right capital structure in equilibrium. Exten-
sions of the basic model generate cases where the
allocation of resources determined by the market is
not necessarily optimal, but minimum capital
requirements still do not seem to improve welfare
(and, in fact, may actually reduce it). While this
work raises important questions, the applicability
of its findings for policy may be limited by the sim-
plicity of the model. In particular, the discussant,
Vincenzo Quadrini (New York University), noted
that this model may not capture all the relevant
externalities associated with the functioning of
financial markets.
Changes in capital requirements can, in principle,
affect how banks price risk and change the cyclical
properties of bank capital. Van den Heuvel (2004)
examines how capital-adequacy requirements alter
the role of bank lending in the transmission of mone-
tary policy. He constructs a dynamic partial-equilib-
rium model of bank asset and liability management
thatincorporatesrisk-basedcapitalrequirements.This
model shows that the effects of monetary policy on
bank lending depend on the capital adequacy of the
banking sector and that shocks to bank proﬁts can
have a persistent effect on lending. Bank capital affects
bank lending even when the regulatory constraints on
bank capital are not binding. Given new capital
requirements under Basel II and their potential to
change the dynamics of bank capital, more research in
the area of the interaction between bank capital stand-
ards and monetary policy is very important. The dis-
cussant, Césaire Meh (Bank of Canada), argued for the
importance of future research using general-equilib-
rium models.
Chant (2004) focuses on the governance of Canadian
banks, investigating whether linkages between bank
boards and the boards of non-ﬁnancial corporations
inﬂuence the pattern and performance of bank lend-
ing. Based on a preliminary exploration of Canadian
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over the 1996 to 1998 period, he reaches four main
conclusions: i) Canadian banks are more likely to lend
to corporations with which they share board linkages
than to corporations linked with other banks; ii) the
tendency to lend to linked corporations is stronger
where the link involves a corporate ofﬁcer than where
it consists of shared directors; iii) there is weak evi-
dence that corporations that receive loans from banks
linked by ofﬁcers have a higher probability of experi-
encing a downgraded credit rating than corporate
borrowers in general; and iv) there is no evidence that
the credit-rating experience of borrowers who are
linked to the lending bank through directors differs
from that of other borrowers. The author points out
that more work is needed to test the robustness of
these results, particularly given the short sample
period used in the analysis. Future research could also
focus on the factors that may be driving these results,
including the possibility that there may be informa-
tional advantages to banks from corporate links.
Panel Discussion
The panel discussion, featuring Angela Redish
(University of British Columbia), Charles Freedman
(Carleton University), and Claudio Borio (Bank for
International Settlements), provided an excellent
forum for a general discussion of the conference
papers. Aside from the specific comments on papers
noted above, the discussion included such issues as
the notion of systemic risk implicit in the conference
papers, the state of the models used to address this
notion, and the role of the central bank in pursuing
this line of research.
Freedman linked the conference papers to the two
main reasons why the Bank of Canada has, since its
inception in 1935, been interested in research on
issues affecting the ﬁnancial system, even though it
does not have regulatory or supervisory responsibili-
ties for individual ﬁnancial institutions. Such research
helps the Bank, first, to gain a better understanding
of how monetary policy is transmitted through the
ﬁnancial system to the real economy; and, second, to
fulﬁll its role as an adviser to the government on the
periodic revisions of legislation governing financial
institutions. Freedman and Borio agreed that central
banks have tended to emphasize the asset side of
balance sheets in their recent research on the trans-
mission mechanism, as in the Van den Heuvel paper,
but should also remain concerned with the liability
side in work on issues of ﬁnancial stability.
Borio commented on the notion of systemic risk implicit
in the conference papers. Systemic risk results when
the failure of an individual institution leads to broader
ﬁnancial instability. The failure occurs because of an
exogenous shock to liquidity or asset values within a
fragile ﬁnancial structure. Borio points out that this
notion of risk is problematic, in part because it is static
in nature and because it treats risk as exogenous. In
his view, this notion does not correspond well with
the reality that financial instability tends to build up
over time and is endogenous to the state of the economy,
with its origin not so much in contagion, but in the
shared exposures of financial firms to common risk
factors. These common risk factors are intimately
linked to the business cycle, leading to a financial system
that is excessively procyclical. The implication of this
alternative view of risk is that policy-makers should
promote the prudential operation of the entire regula-
tory and supervisory framework, rather than focusing
on the risk proﬁles of individual institutions.
Redish noted that the answers to the questions
addressed in some of the conference papers were
rather inconclusive, which was perhaps a reﬂection of
theearlystagesofdevelopmentfoundamongtheoretical
and empirical models. She pointed, for example, to
the lack of support in theoretical models for key ele-
ments in the ﬁnancial sector, such as bank capital
requirements and deposit insurance. She urged the
development of a framework to organize future
research in this area, suggesting as a possible starting
point an understanding of why the ﬁnancial system
differs from other sectors in the economy.
The panelists underscored how important it is for
both central banks and academics to research issues rele-
vant to the financial system. The topic of bank diversifi-
cation and consolidation, for instance, was viewed as
raising important issues that merited future research.
Borio concluded from the work on diversiﬁcation that
benefits may exist, but that they are not as great as
business people would have us believe. Freedman
drew the same conclusion, adding that the banking
sector might be experiencing “pendulum swings”
between consolidation and divestiture similar to those
seen in the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector. The out-
standing question is, why have the recent trends
towards conglomeration continued in recent years if
there are no beneﬁts to such a strategy?
Generally, the panelists saw a role for central banks in
assessing and commenting on developments in the
financial system, even though the issues are not their31 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • AUTUMN 2004
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direct responsibility. Borio and Freedman advocated a
role for central banks in commenting on such develop-
ments because of their ability to take the long-run view.
That said, Freedman added the caveat that such com-
mentsareoftenmisinterpretedorignoredbythemarkets.
Conclusions
The conference papers highlight the important inter-
action between ﬁnancial governance and ﬁnancial and
economic activity. For example, there is compelling
evidence that good regulatory governance is key to
the sound functioning of the ﬁnancial system. Also,
there is evidence that the regulation of bank capital
can have important implications for the portfolio
choices of banks and for the monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism.
As the conference panelists noted, however, the confer-
ence yielded more questions for future research than
clear policy recommendations. For instance, the papers
presented by Dionne and Gale underscore the need
for further research on the appropriate design and
effects of bank-capital requirements. More work in the
area of contagion is also needed to understand how
shocks are propagated through the ﬁnancial system.
In pursuing this work, it will be important to empha-
size the development of theoretical and empirical
models that include key real-world characteristics and
that could be used to guide policy-makers.